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Australian foreign policy has generally been considered to be bipartisan, and 
Australia has broadly enjoyed a positive image among its neighbours in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and more widely as an active ‘middle power’ in the 
international community. However, the Liberal-National Coalition government of 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott, elected on September 7, 2013, has already 
engendered a considerable degree of dispute over its foreign policy priorities. 
These range across a number of issues and areas, including a sudden deterioration 
in relations with Australia’s largest neighbour Indonesia, over espionage 
revelations. This could undermine a core campaign promise of the Abbott 
government, to ‘stop the boats’, halting asylum seekers arriving by boat via 
Indonesia. Difficulties may further arise with Overseas Development Aid (ODA) 
cuts, which will principally affect the poorer nations of the South Pacific. 
Australia also appears to be taking sides among its major trading partners, 
openly declaring its support for Japan over China, in the ongoing territorial 
disputes in the East China Sea. Australia remains a loyal ally of the USA, 
deploying troops to Afghanistan, hosting US forces as part of their strategic ‘pivot’ 
to the Pacific, and has again joined a US-led coalition undertaking military action 
in Iraq. On the wider international stage, Australia has taken up its rotating seat 
on the UN Security Council, is part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade 
negotiations, and was host for the 2014 G20 leaders’ summit. However, the Abbott 
government is weakening Australia’s commitment to international action on 
climate change. The foreign policy direction of the Abbott government therefore 
seems set to continue to court controversy. 
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II. The Overall Foreign Policy Approach of the Abbott Coalition Government 
1. Conservative Ideology and Defence/Security Policy 
The ideological motivations of the conservative Liberal-National Party 
Coalition traditionally stem from its allegiance to the British Commonwealth, and 
being strongly pro-American. The Menzies Coalition government sought 
Australia’s participation in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Malayan 
‘Emergency’ and the Borneo ‘Confrontation’.1 The Fraser Coalition government 
was firmly anti-Soviet during the Cold War, and the Howard government backed 
the US in its invasion and occupation of Iraq from 2003. The Coalition has also 
long promoted a neoliberal free trade economic agenda, and a pro-Israeli position 
at the United Nations (UN). The Howard government was reluctant to take action 
against climate change, refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol.2 
Foreign policy is generally a bipartisan issue in Australian politics; both 
major parties – the Liberal-National Party Coalition, and the social-democratic 
Labor Party, share similar policies of being strongly supportive of the military 
alliance with the USA, promoting free trade, and encouraging engagement with 
the Asia-Pacific region, through involvement in International Government 
Organisations.3 However, elements of foreign policy were hotly contested in the 
2013 federal election, primarily over the issue of asylum seekers arriving by boat; 
the Coalition advocated measures to deter asylum seekers, campaigning with the 
slogan to ‘stop the boats’, subsequently implemented following its election victory.4 
A bipartisan policy position continuing under the Abbott Coalition 
government is Australia remaining firmly part of the strategic ‘pivot’ of the USA, 
its closest military ally, towards the Pacific region. US Marines and other US 
forces have been ‘based’ in the Northern Territory since 2012, in rotating 
deployments. US long-range surveillance drones may also be deployed from the 
Australian territory of the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean. Australia is also 
likely to continue its low-scale military advisory role in Afghanistan, after the 
withdrawal of NATO/ISAF combat forces by the end of 2014. Australia had the 
largest non-NATO presence in Afghanistan, primarily to reinforce the 
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commitment to the US alliance.5 
Abbott has pledged to increase defence spending from 1.6% of GDP, to an 
aspirational target of 2%; purchases of US military equipment, including up to $24 
billion on 72 of the controversial F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters, will most 
likely comprise a large part of this projected increase. A new Defence White Paper 
due for release in 2015 is likely to confirm this direction towards increasing 
defence expenditure. Australia will therefore make its own contribution to the 
arms race under way in the Asia-Pacific region, with no real diplomatic action 
being taken to reduce the extensive rise in regional conventional weapons 
expenditure.6  
Meanwhile, preparations for the ANZAC centenary in 2015 are underway, 
with Australia set to spend up to $325 million on First World War 
commemorations, more than any other country. Critics have accused successive 
governments of effectively deepening a ‘cult’ of ANZAC jingoism, while ignoring 
any sensible discussion or analysis of the long-running drift in strategic doctrine 
and defence spending of recent decades. 7  Australian intelligence services, 
including the Australian Signals Directorate, have also been implicated in the 
USA’s global surveillance network PRISMS, as revealed by whistle-blower Edward 
Snowden, including possible involvement in the USA’s secretive lethal drone 
strikes.8 
 
2. The Deepening Australian National Security State 
The Abbott government has continued the trend of the previous Howard 
Coalition government of increasing surveillance powers of the security services, 
supposedly justified by at least 60 Australians fighting overseas for radical 
jihadists in Syria and Iraq, with 15 having been killed. To counter these 
concerning developments, new legislation, the Counter-terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill, is expected to pass with bipartisan support9. 
These new counter-terrorism measures have included proposals to: potentially 
collect the online metadata of all Australians; reverse the onus of proof of people 
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returning from travel to Syria and Iraq that they are not engaged in terrorism; 
proscribe Australians from visiting certain areas in those countries which are 
under control of radical Islamists; and increase penalties for journalists, public 
servants and other whistleblowers found guilty of revealing ‘special’ intelligence 
operations.10  
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) are also to get expanded powers, with new anti-terror 
legislation, the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill, again passed with 
bipartisan support from the Opposition Labor Party.11 Australia’s counter-terror 
laws, which have been recently used to detain suspects in recent police raids, are 
already among the most severe of the Western democracies, with no Bill of Rights 
to secure against potential abuses by security authorities. Prime Minister Abbott 
has warned that Australians will have to sacrifice some freedoms for security, into 
the indeterminate future. However, such measures have been criticised by civil 
liberties groups, lawyers and commentators as an unnecessary overreach, and 
possibly unconstitutional, with these policies poorly presented by the 
Attorney-General, Senator George Brandis. Espousing patriotic rhetoric of 
protecting national security – such as Abbott encouraging migrants, citizens and 
the media to belong to ‘Team Australia’ – plays to the Coalition’s conservative 
electoral support base, but risks alienating the Muslim community in Australia. 
The heightened focus on counter-terrorism (encouraged by extensive media 
coverage) has assisted in diverting public attention from the Abbott government’s 
generally unpopular domestic policies; particularly its first harsh Federal budget 
brought down in May 2014, which broke numerous election campaign promises to 
not cut funding to health, education, welfare, and public broadcasting.12 
 
3. Cuts to Overseas Development Aid 
Another early controversy in the foreign policy of the Abbott Coalition 
government was the announcement soon after the election by Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop of cuts to the ODA budget, of up to $4.5 billion over the next five 
years. These cuts, which break a 2013 election campaign promise by the Coalition, 
are largely in the form of deferred budget increases previously pledged by the 
previous Labor government, which had also made similar deferments in 2012. 
AusAID, Australia’s ODA delivery arm, has been abolished as a separate agency, 
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with its services subsumed directly within the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT).13  
Bishop has argued the cuts will ensure the ‘sustainability’ of the overall aid 
program, which will be directed more towards promoting trade and infrastructure 
development. This approach is criticized by human rights and aid/development 
NGOs as continuing the practice of ‘tied aid’, benefitting Australian corporate 
contractors, rather than the ostensible ODA recipients in developing countries. 
Critics are concerned the ODA changes will adversely impact development in 
South Pacific countries in particular, as traditional poverty alleviation and 
humanitarian programs are defunded. In preparing for the Coalition’s first 
Federal Budget in May 2014, Treasurer Joe Hockey indicated though that the 
government aims to finally meet Australia’s Millennium Development Goals 
commitment of a foreign aid target of 0.5% of Gross National Income, once the 
budget is returned to surplus – for which the earliest projection is after 2017.14 
Budget cuts have also led to the closing of the Australia Network and Radio 
Australia, the public broadcasting services of the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation to the Asia-Pacific region; a measure widely derided by aid groups as 
a self-defeating, penny-pinching reduction in Australia’s regional ‘soft power’ 
diplomacy.15 In its stead, Bishop announced an ‘economic diplomacy initiative’, 
where DFAT’s 96 diplomatic missions will concentrate on promoting Australian 
trade and business, with creation of ‘market intelligence’ services.16  Overall, 
DFAT’s 2014-15 budget of $1,404.8 million will be cut by around $397 million over 
the next four years, including a reduction of over 500 staff, out of 4,200 Australian 
and 2,400 local overseas personnel. This perpetuates a worrying long-term trend 
of reducing government spending on Australian foreign affairs and diplomacy, 
while defence and security spending increases. This prompts subsequent concern 
that DFAT’s traditional role in foreign policy formation is being steadily sidelined, 
as the defence establishment, including the intelligence services, and the Prime 
Minister’s Office gain disproportionate influence.17 
 
III. Asylum Seekers and Human Rights 
1. The Return of the ‘Pacific Solution’, and Relations with Indonesia and East 
Timor 
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In 2008, the previous Rudd Labor government ended the Howard Coalition 
government’s ‘Pacific Solution’, of the offshore detention in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) and Nauru of asylum seekers arriving by boat (mostly to the Australian 
Indian Ocean territory of Christmas Island). Asylum seekers have been a highly 
contested political issue, exploited relentlessly as a matter of national security by 
the Coalition while in Opposition during 2007-2013, with up to 300 asylum 
seekers likely to have drowned at sea. After Tony Abbott became Opposition 
Leader in December 2009, the Coalition’s slogan to ‘stop the boats!’ was 
prominently used in the 2010 election campaign (which resulted in a rare minority 
Labor government, in a ‘hung’ parliament’), and repeated in 2013, following the 
steady increase in the number of boat arrivals; from 2008 to 2013, 742 boats 
arrived, carrying 43,198 asylum seekers.18 
Perpetuating the ongoing drama over the Labor Party’s unstable leadership 
during this period, Kevin Rudd made a temporary return as Prime Minister in 
June 2013, overthrowing Julia Gillard in a party room spill, as desperate Labor 
MPs hoped to reverse the government’s dire position in the opinion polls. In an 
attempt to blunt Opposition criticism over Labor’s record on asylum seeker boat 
arrivals, Rudd effectively restored the Pacific Solution, making a deal with PNG to 
re-open a detention centre on Manus Island to hold asylum seekers (Gillard had 
already began to send them again to Nauru). Asylum seekers arriving by boat 
were denied any right of settlement in Australia. The number of boat arrivals 
began to fall following this measure, and have continued to do so following the 
election of the Abbott Coalition government, with none arriving since February 
2014; both major political parties claim credit for restoring this deterrent 
approach.19 
Abbott made his first overseas visit as Prime Minister in October 2013, to 
Indonesia, making good a Coalition promise that its foreign policy approach would 
be focused on ‘Jakarta, not Geneva’. The visit was ostensibly to emphasise 
business, trade, investment, education and people-to-people links. The main 
underlying motivation for the visit though, was to ensure border security 
cooperation, in tackling people smuggling networks. Key to the Coalition’s election 
pledge to ‘stop the boats’ was the policy to turn back asylum seeker boats ‘when 
safe to do so’, while respecting Indonesian sovereignty.20 
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However, the Abbott government was not long in office when revelations 
emerged (via the Edward Snowden leaks) that Australia had spied on Indonesia’s 
leadership in 2009, and conducted commercial espionage (on behalf of the US) 
against Indonesia in early 2013. Even though this occurred under the previous 
Rudd and Gillard Labor governments, Indonesia was understandably still angered, 
and unsatisfied with Abbott’s fairly weak apology. Amid the revelations of 
Australian spying on Indonesia, it also emerged that the previous Howard 
Coalition government had spied on newly independent East Timor in 2006, during 
negotiations over the Timor Gap Treaty for rights to oil and gas development. East 
Timor has taken Australia to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to annul the 
treaty, partly as a result of these revelations. In a further potential break of 
international law, the Abbott government has attempted to interfere with the 
Timorese case, by blocking witnesses from leaving Australia to deliver evidence; 
an ex-Australian Secret Intelligence Service officer’s passport was suspended to 
prevent him travelling to The Hague to give his testimony, and the lawyers’ office 
for East Timor in Canberra was subject to raids by ASIO.21 
 
2. Operation Sovereign Borders 
Upon coming to office, the Abbott government commenced its border 
protection policy, termed ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’, under military 
operational command. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) began its ‘turnbacks’, 
although Immigration and Border Protection Minister Scott Morrison initially 
refused to confirm any numbers or details, leading to criticism that the policy 
lacked transparency. Revelations that the RAN had violated Indonesian territorial 
sovereignty while doing so saw relations with Indonesia deteriorate to their lowest 
point since the East Timor crisis of 1999.22 Morrison later revealed that on twelve 
occasions, boats have been either towed back, or asylum seekers placed onto 
lifeboats and released into Indonesian waters, returning 1265 asylum seekers; 45 
boats were prevented from leaving Indonesian, Malaysian and Sri Lankan ports.23 
There has long been ongoing criticism from the UNHCR, Amnesty 
International and other human rights NGOs of the adverse impact of Australia’s 
lengthy detention of asylum seekers.24 In January 2014, Nauru saw its senior 
legal personnel, including the Chief Justice, Chief Magistrate and 
                                               
21 Mong Palatino, ‘East Timor-Australia Spying Scandal’, The Diplomat, December 16, 2013. 
22 ‘Go North Young Man’, The Economist, February 1, 2014. 
23 Scott Morrison, ‘A year of stronger borders’, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
media release, September 18, 2014. 
24 Ben Saul, ‘Dark Justice: Australia’s Indefinite Detention of Refugees on Security Grounds Under 
International Human Rights Law’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol.13 (2012), pp.44-45. 
Australian Foreign Policy: Challenges for the Abbott Coalition Government 
58 
 
Solicitor-General unlawfully fired by the Nauruan President. This practically 
ended the rule of law in this Australian-subsidised South Pacific micro-state, 
being yet another deterioration of human and legal rights in the region linked to 
Australia’s asylum seeker policy; over 1000 asylum seekers detained on Nauru 
were left with no effective legal address to review their claims. Restrictions on 
media and NGO investigation of Nauru, as well as judicial inquiries being 
impeded on Manus Island, have also compounded the Coalition government’s 
tendency towards suppressing information and avoiding scrutiny of its treatment 
of asylum seekers.25 The human rights record of the Abbott Coalition government 
was also blotted early on by its approach to Sri Lanka – again to secure 
cooperation against people smuggling. As the co-chair of the Commonwealth 
Heads Of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in Sri Lanka in November 2013, 
Abbott downplayed widespread concerns over human rights abuses committed by 
the Rajapaksa government, in the wake of the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 
2009.26 
On February 16-17 2014, an Iranian asylum seeker was killed, and over 60 
injured in a riot on Manus Island, with local PNG detention centre staff accused of 
perpetrating most of the violence. This was the most serious incident so far in a 
long series of claims of poor treatment of asylum seekers, on Nauru and mainland 
detention centres, as well as on Manus.27 To attempt to improve detention camp 
conditions on Manus Island, Tony Abbott visited PNG in March 2014, partly to 
encourage faster processing and resettling of asylum seekers. However, there are 
doubts they can be successfully integrated into such a clannish developing society, 
already stricken with high rates of criminal violence. The PNG government has 
stated it will resettle some, but not all those detained on Manus found to be 
genuine refugees.28 After another death in detention on Manus Island, of an Iraqi 
asylum seeker, Australia’s asylum policies were criticised in September 2014 by 
the new UN Human Rights Commissioner, noting the pressures of lack of space 
and poor conditions in the present facilities on Manus Island and Nauru. Also of 
extreme concern are Hazara asylum seekers being returned to Afghanistan, where 
they are at grave risk from the Taliban, a possible refoulement breach of the UN 
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This reminds that the great majority of those seeking asylum in Australia (up 
to 90%) are found to be genuine refugees after processing. Indicating that 
Operation Sovereign Borders is reaching its effective limits, no asylum seekers 
have been sent to Manus Island since February 2014, at the request of the PNG 
government. An asylum seeker boat containing 157 Tamils intercepted in June 
2014 was detained for over a month at sea, and then brought to the Curtin 
detention centre on the mainland for processing, briefly undermining the 
government’s claims it had ‘stopped the boats’. The Tamils were then interned in 
Nauru, pending return to India, although this action has been challenged by the 
UNCHR in the Australian High Court.30 In an effort to relieve the pressure on 
Nauru and Manus Island, Cambodia has also agreed to accept settlement of 
asylum seekers detained by Australia, in return for $40 million in ODA, despite 
concerns over its poor human rights record.31 
The Abbott Coalition government has removed the right of asylum seekers to 
claim permanent residency, and restricted access to work rights, health care, 
social security and other welfare benefits, further eroding the human rights of 
already traumatised people. These measures could affect up to 30,000 claimants 
who have been granted temporary protection visas. However, a recent ruling by 
the Australian High Court against indefinite detention could make these 
measures invalid. To get around this ruling, Immigration Minister Morrison 
secured a deal with the Palmer United Party to pass legislation re-introducing 
temporary protection visas (TPVs), previously used by the Howard Coalition 
government. Termed this time as Safe Haven Enterprise Visas (SHEVs), these 
would allow asylum seekers to remain in Australia and work for up to five years, 
particularly in regional areas.32 As of September 2014, 2,539 people were in 
detention on the Australian mainland, 307 on Christmas Island, 1,140 on Nauru, 
and 1,060 on Manus Island; 24,775 were in the community on bridging visas.33 
To restore relations with Indonesia, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop engaged in 
a series of crisis talks. A joint code of conduct has since been negotiated to restore 
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security cooperation, which includes a promise by Australia not to spy on 
Indonesia in future, confirmed and signed in a visit to Bali by Bishop in August 
2014.34 It remains to be seen whether this diplomatic reconciliation will continue 
under the administration of new Indonesian President Jokowi. Long-term regional 
cooperation is the ultimate answer to solving the asylum seeker issue; the ad hoc 
‘Bali Process’ dialogue between regional states began in 2002, but this has made 
little progress. Any diplomatic renewal towards re-starting the Bali Process has 
been undermined by Operation Sovereign Borders potentially alienating 
Australia’s largest neighbour Indonesia, exploiting populist xenophobia for 
domestic political gain. Opinion polls show harsher treatment of asylum seekers 
remains popular with the majority of voters, as the most prominent claim of an 
election promise fulfilled by the Coalition.35 
 
IV. Australia on the Wider International Stage 
1. Australia’s Role in International Government Organisations 
Abbott attended his first major multilateral overseas meetings at the 2013 
APEC leaders’ summit in Indonesia, and the ASEAN/East Asia Summits in Brunei. 
Apart from conducting multilateral and concurrent bilateral meetings with other 
Asia-Pacific heads of state, Abbott made a major diplomatic declaration at these 
summits: the goal of completing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Australia’s 
three top trading partners – China, Japan, and South Korea, within a year. The 
Abbott government has also continued Australia’s bipartisan commitment to the 
multilateral TPP trade negotiations, as well as the less-noted parallel Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) scheme, aiming for an East Asian 
multilateral free trade zone. The other major diplomatic declaration by Abbott at 
the 2013 Brunei summit was his overt support for Japan as Australia’s ‘closest 
friend in Asia’.36 
This follows Abbott’s description in his 2009 book Battlelines of the 
‘Anglosphere’, the English-speaking democracies which are Australia’s natural 
allies, predominantly the US, the UK, New Zealand and Canada. 37  Closer 
relations with Japan indicates that Japan is regarded by the Abbott government 
as an honorary member of the Anglosphere. At the sidelines of the APEC 2013 
summit, Australia, Japan and the US held another meeting of the Trilateral 
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Security Dialogue, demonstrating the trend towards deepening security ties 
among the three countries. Australia could potentially take advantage of Japan 
recently easing its restrictions on military exports, with particular interest in 
buying Japanese submarines in future. Australia has sided with Japan in its 
dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, leading to a public rebuke of 
Julie Bishop by China’s foreign minister, after China declared its Air Defence 
Identification Zone in the East China Sea in December 2013.38 
The main point of diplomatic contention between Australia and Japan has 
been over Japan’s discredited ‘scientific’ whaling program. The Abbott government 
continued the bipartisan policy of opposing whaling; however, Australian 
surveillance of the Japanese whaling fleet in the Southern Antarctic Ocean was 
reduced under the Coalition, with only brief aircraft overflights conducted, rather 
than sending a customs patrol vessel (otherwise being used in Operation 
Sovereign Borders against asylum seekers), again breaking an election campaign 
promise. The case brought by the previous Labor government against Japan in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) went against Japan in March 2014, in a 12-4 
ruling. This has subsumed the issue for the near future, until Japan revamps its 
whaling program to work around the ICJ’s judgement.39 
After an intense lobbying effort by the Rudd/Gillard Labor governments, in 
2012 Australia won a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), for 2013-14. This diplomatic bid was opposed at the time by the Coalition, 
but nevertheless Abbott accepted the win once it was secured, therefore continuing 
Australia’s long tradition of supporting and participating in the UN and its 
peace-keeping operations. Australia has already taken its turn holding the 
Presidency of the Security Council, holding votes on international crises such as 
the Syrian civil war, and conflicts and interventions in the Central African 
Republic, South Sudan and the Ukraine.40  
Quite prominently, Foreign Minister Bishop in July 2014 led the UNSC to 
adopt Resolution 2166, to demand international access to the crash site of flight 
MH17 shot down in contested eastern Ukraine, where 298 passengers and crew 
died, including 38 Australians. 41  An AFP team was sent as part of the 
international crash investigation, and Bishop visited Kiev to announce the 
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establishment of an embassy to demonstrate Australia’s backing for Ukraine, 
which also included Australia joining the US, the EU, and Japan in imposing 
economic sanctions against Russia’s seizure of the Crimea, and its support for the 
insurgency in eastern Ukraine.42 
Bishop has also shifted Australia towards a more overtly pro-Israeli position, 
controversially reversing Australia’s previous recognition of Palestine as an 
aspirant state at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and supporting Israel’s 
illegal settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The Australian 
government will also now no longer refer to East Jerusalem as ‘Occupied territory’ 
– a change to a bipartisan position held since 1967.43 It has also been revealed 
that in October 2013, under Bishop’s direction, DFAT opposed New Zealand 
sponsoring a statement at the UNGA (also later sponsored by Japan) pushing for 
nuclear disarmament, in order to secure Australia’s reliance on US nuclear 
deterrence.44 
Hosting the Brisbane G20 leaders’ summit in November 2014 has been the 
most prominent diplomatic event for the Abbott government so far; the largest 
visit of world leaders to Australia since the 2007 APEC summit hosted in Sydney, 
but also diplomatically fraught, given the complications of having Russian 
President Vladimir Putin in attendance.45 However, there may be no real progress 
on the G20’s supposed ‘reform’ agenda, with post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
regulatory reforms of the international financial system having effectively stalled. 
Another of Abbott’s first major international diplomatic appearances was at the 
World Economic Forum in Geneva, where he gave a speech declaring Australia’s 
aims to use the G20 to promote free trade, and reduce taxes and government 
spending. Abbott also broke diplomatic convention by attacking the economic 
record of the previous Labor government, particularly its stimulus spending 
during the GFC, which prevented a recession.46 At a preliminary G20 finance 
ministers’ meeting in Sydney, Treasurer Joe Hockey repeated this neoliberal 
economic rhetoric of the Coalition, of the need for reducing the size and role of 
government, in order to encourage private sector activity. However, the record of 
these small-government austerity policies as a policy response to the GFC is 
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believed by many economists to be a failure, particularly in Europe.47 
 
2. Australia and Climate Change 
An even more controversial international policy position of the Abbott 
government is its weakening of Australia’s commitment to action on global 
warming, seen in the removal of climate change from the G20 summit’s agenda by 
host Australia. Some of the first acts of the Coalition in government were to 
abolish the advisory Climate Change Authority and the Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation, and to weaken the renewable energy target of 20% by 2020, with cuts 
to public science funding, and no separate Ministry for Science in the new Cabinet. 
Environment Minister Greg Hunt did not attend the November 2013 COP19 UN 
meeting in Warsaw, with only lower-level bureaucrats being sent to represent 
Australia. Climate change sceptics are influential in the Coalition, and Abbott’s 
own record on the subject is rather erratic, having previously described climate 
science as ‘crap’.48 
The Abbott government has repealed Labor’s ‘carbon tax’ legislation – a fixed 
price on carbon emissions paid by the 300 largest polluters, meant to shift to a 
floating price from 2014. This was to be replaced with the Coalition’s ‘Direct Action’ 
policy: subsidising large polluters to reduce emissions, encouraging 
biosequestration, plus increased regulation and projects such as a ‘Green Army’ to 
promote reforestation. Hunt’s recent policy White Paper, detailing a $2.55 billion 
Emissions Reduction Fund has been widely criticised by economists and climate 
scientists as inadequate and ultimately unfeasible, doubting that Australia will be 
able to reach the declared target of 5% emission cuts by 2020, under the Direct 
Action plan.49 Labor and the Greens initially blocked the repeal of the carbon tax 
in the Senate, but after July 2014, the balance of power in the Senate has shifted 
to the populist Palmer United Party (PUP). Although PUP and a fractious group of 
allied minor party Senators voted to abolish the carbon tax, they refused to 
support Direct Action; hence, Australia is the first country to remove a price on 
carbon, and is effectively left without a viable climate policy.50 
Compounding this erosion of Australia’s position on climate change, Abbott 
did not attend the UN Climate Summit held in New York in September 2014, 
attended by over 120 other world leaders, but was replaced by Julie Bishop. Abbott 
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was in New York at the time, but instead addressed the UNSC on the crisis in Iraq 
and Syria. His subsequent address to the UNGA highlighted Australia’s historical 
and ongoing contribution to the UN as a modest, yet practical ‘good global citizen’ 
in the wider international community, while pointedly ignoring the issue of 
climate change.51 
 
3. Abbott’s Northeast Asian Tour 
One of the most prominent diplomatic acts of the Coalition government so far 
was Tony Abbott’s visit to northeast Asia in April 2014, which included an 
especially large entourage of three senior ministers, five State premiers, 30 
corporate CEOs, and hundreds of business representatives and advisers. Abbott’s 
visit to Japan during April 5-7 saw the completion of an Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with Japan, ending Australian tariffs on Japanese 
manufacturing imports, in return for greater (but not full) Australian access to 
Japanese agriculture markets, particularly beef, wine, and horticultural products. 
This finally concluded negotiations which had been ongoing since 2007, the lack of 
progress largely due to resistance by Japanese farmers to greater foreign market 
access.52 
Abbott was also the first foreign leader to attend a meeting of Japan’s new 
National Security Council, and announced negotiations for an agreement to 
encourage joint development of military technology, equipment and weapons 
systems. Abbott expressed support for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s aim to allow 
Japan to re-interpret its constitution, to allow participation in collective 
self-defence with allies, and resume arms exports. Australia and Japan will also 
deepen security cooperation, including more joint training exercises to improve 
interoperability between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Japanese 
Self Defence Forces. 53  These ties were consolidated by Abe’s return visit to 
Australia in July 2014, where he was granted the rare privilege of an address to a 
joint sitting of Parliament. During the visit, Abe and Abbott formally signed both 
the EPA, and the rapidly-drafted Agreement on the Transfer of Defence 
Equipment and Technology.54 
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After a visit to South Korea to formally sign another recently concluded FTA 
(which presently remains unratified by the divided South Korean parliament), 
Abbott’s visit to China during April 9-11 aimed to reassure China over Australia’s 
closer security ties with Japan, and to also pursue an FTA for greater market 
access to Australia’s largest trading partner.55 However, this will be one of the 
greater diplomatic challenges for the Coalition, given Abbott’s overt support for 
Japan’s more nationalistic assertions of its security policies, and the intention of 
the US to upgrade its deployment of Marine Corps units to the Northern Territory 
of Australia, seen by China as part of the USA’s ‘pivot’ strategy of encirclement.56  
No doubt hoping to placate his hosts, Abbott welcomed China’s economic rise, 
declaring that its growing military strength poses no threat to the region, and that 
Australia comes to trade with China, not just to ‘do a deal, but to be a friend’.57 
However, in a speech to the Asia Society made just before his trip, Abbott also 
implied China will inevitably liberalise its society and political system – which 
would inevitably raise suspicions among the ruling Chinese Communist Party. 
Chinese tariffs imposed on Australia coal imports also put an FTA in some doubt.58 
Further afield in Asia, Abbott’s visit to India in September 2014, meeting new 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, confirmed a deal for Australia to supply uranium 
for Indian nuclear power plants; a controversial decision, since India remains 
outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This move sought to further 
strengthen the growing economic and security ties between Australia and India.59 
While Abbott’s tours of Asia can be considered relatively successful, the Coalition 
government confronts the challenge of managing Australia’s foreign policy 
interests in a more uncertain, potentially volatile region, with growing strategic 
competition between China and its hegemonic rivals: the US, Japan and the 
ASEAN states. While the Australian economy should continue to perform 
relatively well, assisted by the new regional EPAs, these gains in trade will be 
threatened if relations with China deteriorate among the Asia-Pacific region. 
Rather optimistically, Abbott and Bishop hope the mutual self-interest northeast 
Asian countries have in continuing trade and peaceful relations will trump the 
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present geopolitical tensions, ultimately averting the danger of conflict. Australia’s 
role is therefore to ‘lead by example’, maintaining positive relations among states 
in the region. 60 
 
V. Australia Goes Back to War 
The response of the US-organised coalition of up to 30 countries to the 
recently worsening insurgency waged by Da’esh (also known as Islamic State, ISIL, 
and ISIS) in northern Iraq and Syria, has again highlighted the core foreign 
relationship for Australia; its military alliance with the US. Following the rout of 
Iraqi forces inflicted by Da’esh in June-July 2014, including the fall of Mosul, the 
Abbott government quickly offered in August to join the US, UK and France in the 
airlift of humanitarian aid to threatened communities in Iraq, particularly Yazidis, 
Christians, and Kurds. RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) transports also began 
delivery of weapons to Kurdish peshmerga forces resisting Da’esh. Excoriating 
Da’esh as an ‘apocalyptic death cult’, in September Abbott announced that 
following a decision of the National Security Committee of Cabinet, an ADF task 
force would be sent to Iraq, comprising six Super Hornet attack fighters, with two 
support aircraft and 400 ground personnel, and 200 Special Forces troops as 
military advisers to the Iraqi armed forces. RAAF operational combat flights ‘to 
degrade and destroy’ Da’esh commenced from October 5, supporting those of the 
US and at least 13 other countries.61 
The almost automatic reaction of the Abbott government to order ADF 
participation in US-led military operations thus follows the Australian foreign 
policy tradition of rapidly committing to US military action, even pre-emptively – 
as in the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War of 2003. While this plays to the 
traditional political strength of the Coalition, in national security issues, it is 
doubtful whether this latest military intervention in Iraq serves any clear or 
specific national security interest for Australia, apart from demonstrating loyalty 
to its primary ally America. This comes at the expense of focusing on the 
Asia-Pacific, Australia’s core strategic area of interest, as well as the direct 
financial cost of these new military operations, expected to be at least around an 
additional $500 million per annum.62 
 Unlike the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, this latest US-led intervention is 
likely to prove legal under international law, given that it is at the invitation of the 
Iraqi government, and is aimed at protecting civilian populations from an 
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immediate dire threat (potentially even genocide), thus meeting the criteria of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine. However, any similar intervention against 
Da’esh forces in Syria, thus becoming involved with the bloody civil war that has 
raged there since 2011, is legally more questionable. Also highly concerning is the 
prospect this intervention will facilitate atrocities by Iraqi Shi’ite militias (with 
covert Iranian backing), including ethnic cleansing against Sunni communities, as 
territory is taken back from Da’esh militants.63 The Opposition Labor Party has 
given the Abbott government bipartisan support for the ADF deployment to Iraq, 
not wanting to be seen as ‘weak’ on national security. The minority Greens Party, 
and a few other minor party and Independent MPs have been more sceptical, 
decrying the lack of any parliamentary debate on Australia’s latest military 
engagement; however, these dissident voices have been left sidelined.64 
This demonstrates the generally poor quality of debate and lack of 
government accountability on serious foreign policy issues in Australia. Long-term 
strategic questions remain unaddressed; in particular, how to effectively defeat 
Da’esh, given the past failures of the Iraqi Army, and the reluctance of 
neighbouring states to take determined action to shape a stable political order in 
the Middle East. Abbott concedes that the ADF’s latest involvement could be long 
term, lasting some months – but this intervention is effectively open-ended, and 
could potentially last for years, with the prospect of escalation to ground combat 
forces being deployed.65 The Australian public remains conflicted on military 
action in Iraq, according to opinion polls, as the government has lifted the terror 
threat level from medium to high. As with the 2003 Iraq War, it is feared that 
Australian involvement in US-led military operations in the Middle East again 
makes Australia a more prominent terrorist target.66 
 
VI. Conclusions – The ‘Abbott Doctrine’? 
The foreign policy approach of the Abbott Coalition government in its first 
year has shifted ever more towards its overtly pro-American (and pro-Japanese) 
‘neoconservative’ direction, away from the slightly more balanced approach of the 
previous Labor government. Initially inexperienced in foreign policy, with a lack of 
                                               
63 Kevin Boreham, ‘Australia’s military involvement in Iraq is legal – for now’, The Conversation, 
September 2, 2014. 
64 Max Chalmers, ‘ “We Are Practically At War” Greens Warn as Major Parties Shut Down Iraq 
Debate’, New Matilda, September 1, 2014. 
65 Hugh White, ‘Why the campaign against Islamic State is doomed’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
October 14, 2014. 
66 Michael Safi, ‘Voters support Australian action in Iraq, but say ‘it makes us less safe’ ‘, The 
Guardian, October 10, 2014. 
Australian Foreign Policy: Challenges for the Abbott Coalition Government 
68 
 
appreciation of the complexities of diplomacy, since coming to office Abbott has at 
least superficially promoted his government’s foreign policy as a political strength, 
albeit with a lack of subtlety and nuance in his own personal style. He has been 
assisted by the relatively strong and confident performance of Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop, now favoured as the most popular member (and the only woman) of 
the Abbott Cabinet. Trade minister Andrew Robb has been less visible, but 
generally regarded as reliable, delivering the FTAs with Japan and Korea, and 
playing an active role in the TPP negotiations. Former Defence Minister David 
Johnston was considered less capable so far, demonstrating no real strategic vision 
or particular policy expertise. By contrast, former Immigration Minister Scott 
Morrison was tough and uncompromising in implementing the more militarised 
approach to border control; decried by human rights groups, but electorally 
popular. Nevertheless, suggestions that Morrison might take over an expanded 
‘Homeland Security’-style portfolio was quickly and publicly vetoed by Bishop, 
indicating her ascendance in the Abbott Cabinet.67 However, after more than a 
year in office, Abbott’s Liberal-National government remains behind the Labor 
Party in opinion polls; reflecting his general unpopularity as Prime Minister. 
Despite all his foreign policy efforts, a majority of voters still do not trust Abbott to 
handle international relations effectively.68 
Foreign policy expert Michael Wesley has already suggested the emergence of 
an ‘Abbott Doctrine’: with a range of emerging challengers to the dominant global 
order, from Da’esh, to Putin’s Russia in the Ukraine, and China in the East China 
Sea, Australia’s duty is to be a vocal, active member of the coalition of US allies 
that respond to these revisionist confrontations.69 There are concerns though that 
under Abbott, Australia is deepening its militarisation of foreign and domestic 
security policy, seen in the renewed ADF deployment to Iraq, Operation Sovereign 
Borders, and more draconian anti-terrorist legislation. Particularly worrying is 
the traditional ease of Australia’s entry to war on the decision of the executive, 
with little parliamentary debate (largely due to Labor’s acquiescence in this latest 
instance) or public oversight.70 
As Opposition Leader, Abbott promoted an image of cautious regionalism in 
the Coalition’s foreign policy, that it would be centred on ‘Jakarta, not Geneva’. 
However, once in office, his government has embraced a more assertive 
nationalism. The emphasis on security in Australia’s foreign policy under the 
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Abbott government is most strongly demonstrated in the reinvolvement of the 
ADF in Iraq, and the raised concerns over terrorism. This aims to play to the 
traditional political national security strengths of the Coalition, hoping to detract 
from the domestic political unpopularity of the government’s budget, and of its 
social/economic policies overall. In doing so, the Abbott government has committed 
Australia to an open-ended war yet again in Iraq (and also possibly in Syria). 
Meanwhile, civil liberties are eroding domestically in the name of 
counter-terrorism, while engaging in harsh deterrence against asylum seekers, in 
order to ‘stop the boats’. The reflexive, unquestioning, unconditional support for 
American military action has long been a traditional trope of Australian foreign 
policy. While this has the objective of securing the ANZUS alliance, it risks 
alienating Australia’s wider relations with the region and in the international 
community, at potential long-term cost to the domestic, regional, and global 
interests of Australian society.71 
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